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Abstract—Permissionless distributed ledgers provide a promis-
ing approach to deal with the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm.
Since IoT devices mostly generate data transactions and micro
payments, distributed ledgers that use fees to regulate the
network access are not an optimal choice. In this paper, we
study a feeless architecture developed by IOTA and designed
specifically for the IoT. Due to the lack of fees, malicious nodes
can exploit this feature to generate an unbounded number of
transactions and perform denial of service attacks. We propose
to mitigate these attacks through verifiable delay functions. These
functions, which are non-parallelizable, hard to compute and easy
to verify, have been formulated only recently. In our work, we
design a denial of service prevention mechanism which addresses
network heterogeneity, limited node computational capabilities
and hardware-specific implementation optimizations. Verifiable
delay functions have mostly been studied from a theoretical point
of view, but little has been done in tangible applications. Hence,
this paper can be considered as a pioneer work in the field,
since it builds a bridge between this theoretical mathematical
framework and a real-world problem.
Index Terms—distributed ledger, blockchain, denial of Service,
verifiable delay function, Internet of Things, cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm has initiated a revolu-
tion in human lives through enhanced user experience and new
applications [1]. While IoT devices first reached consumers
through small-scale proprietary networks [2], nowadays these
sensors can be embedded into mobile devices, industrial
equipment, environmental sensors, medical devices, and more.
The widespread availability and the increasing interest in IoT
applications make necessary the creation of secure networks
dealing with thousands or millions of IoT sensors.
A. Distributed ledger technologies for the IoT
Due to the limited resources (e.g., CPU, storage) available,
the design of secure and efficient protocols for IoT networks is
challenging, and proprietary solutions are not anymore able to
cope with their evolving structure. In this paper, we investigate
the recent distributed ledger technology1 (DLT) paradigm as a
secure way to deal with permissionless decentralized IoT net-
works. In the seminal work on blockchain [3], specific network
nodes (miners) validate information through the solution of a
cryptographic puzzle (Proof of Work [4]) in return for some
1A DLT is a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized data without
any central administrator or centralized data storage.
monetary rewards (fees). Apart from the obvious economical
and environmental issues [5], this protocol is not suitable for
the IoT due to fees and to the high workload each node must
perform. However, the interest on the topic has favored the
proliferation of many alternative DLTs, some of them focusing
on the idea of managing the IoT ecosystem. In particular, in
this paper we consider the IoT-oriented permissionless DLT
developed by IOTA [6].
The IOTA protocol builds the Tangle, a directed acyclic
graph, where each vertex is a transaction2. Each time a user
wants to issue a transaction, she has to verify and approve
two recent transactions which then form the edges. This way,
the integrity of the Tangle is ensured by the work of the users
themselves rather than by a different economic set of nodes,
like in the case of blockchain’s miners. Furthermore, no fees
are imposed by the protocol due to the lack of miners, enabling
micro and data transactions, fundamentals in IoT networks.
Unlike blockchain where the mining layer imposes a filter
on which transactions can be written into the ledger, the Tangle
lacks an intrinsic access control algorithm. Since the concepts
of miners and users are merged, IOTA is vulnerable to denial
of service (DoS) attacks, especially in IoT networks where
resources are limited. A DoS attack is a method used to
disrupt legitimate users’ access to a target network or a certain
resource. This is typically done by overloading the target with
a massive amount of traffic. Traditionally, DoS attacks have
been used to target banks, governments or online commercial
retailers. However, since the cryptocurrency market represents
nowadays hundreds of billions of US dollars [7], DLTs have
also become a popular target for DoS attacks. Hence, securing
the stability of these networks is a crucial economical question.
B. Challenges and contributions
In this paper, we propose a lightweight access control
mechanism for DLTs. The task is particularly challenging as
our design must satisfy the following requirements: (i) The
mechanism cannot involve fee-based spam prevention since
IoT devices often need to send data transactions, rather than
monetary payments; (ii) we target heterogeneous networks
where any node can join the network activity by issuing and
writing transactions into the ledger independently of their
2A transaction is a message that transfers data or funds between nodes.
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capabilities; (iii) we consider the presence of malicious nodes
trying to spam the network and perform DoS attacks.
Inspired by the seminal work in spam prevention by Dwork
and Naor [8], and by the recently renewed interest in the field
brought by Boneh et al. [9], we design our solution based
on verifiable delay functions (VDFs). VDFs are functions that
require a preset number of iterations to complete. While VDFs
and Proof of Work (PoW) both aim the evaluator to spend
some time to compute a puzzle, the former is mainly based on
sequentially computing a function (iterative squaring in RSA
groups [10], [11] or points addition in elliptic curves [12])
which cannot be parallelized, making specialized hardware
not able to substantially speed up the puzzle computation.
We highlight that, unlike in PoW-based blockchains, the
cryptographic puzzle discussed in this paper is only used to
prevent DoS attacks, and does not affect the consensus. Our
contributions are threefold:
• Theory. We design a DoS prevention mechanism where
nodes are required to compute exactly τ modular squarings
of a given input message. Our mechanism is based on [10]
which presents characteristics in line with the IoT use
case [13], as we will show in the rest of the paper.
• Implementation. We analyze the VDF evaluation time on
different hardware (IoT, laptop, FPGA), and we optimize the
time needed to verify the correctness of the puzzle through
multiexponentiation techniques [14], [15].
• Analysis. We perform extensive experimental evaluations to
compare VDFs and PoW on different hardware. In particu-
lar, we will show that large monetary resources cannot help
to speed up the VDF evaluation.
We would like to stress here that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this is one of first studies which analyzes, optimizes
and implements VDFs in a real-world problem. Furthermore,
while we build our solution on top of the IOTA Tangle, we aim
this work to be a source of inspiration for other IoT-oriented
permissionless decentralized networks.
Finally, we mention that, in distributed systems, each
identity-based protocol has to deal with the so-called Sybil
attack [16], where participants may create counterfeit identities
in order to, e.g., have a larger weight in a voting protocol
or overcome the access control mechanism. In the IOTA
protocol, the proliferation of Sybil nodes is mitigated through
the definition of a reputation system based on stake. The
details of this approach are beyond the scope of this paper,
and we defer the interested reader to [17].
C. Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we
present some background information about VDFs in Sec-
tion II; then, in Section III we introduce the system model and
the problem statement; after that, we propose our VDF-based
DoS prevention mechanism and we provide its computational
complexity analysis in Section IV; finally, we validate our
findings through simulations in Section V, and we conclude
our paper in Section VI.
II. VERIFIABLE DELAY FUNCTIONS
DoS prevention is a field where functions similar to VDFs
have already been applied: To prevent email spamming, in
the early 1990s Dwork and Naor [8] suggested using squar-
ing roots over finite fields puzzles as functions which take
a predetermined time to compute, and are straightforward
to verify. However, their work was considered impractical
because one has to use rather large finite fields to make
the algorithm useful, and the libraries for handling multiple-
precision arithmetic at the time of the suggestion of the
algorithm were orders of magnitude slower than current ones.
Based on [8], Boneh et al. designed VDFs as functions
that can be evaluated in a given amount of sequential steps
and verified in an exponentially shorter time [9]. The main
innovation was to propose a setup phase to set a trusted
environment allowing the functions to be universally verifiable.
This trusted environment sets the public parameters of the
VDF, including its difficulty which determines the amount
of time spent on computing. Any node who needs to solve
the VDF will use the public parameters to perform certain
sequential computations. Some VDFs also allow generating a
proof to facilitate the verification from the other participants.
This creates a set of three algorithms, computation, proof, and
verification, which are formally described in [9].
To date, the main VDF constructions are based on modular
exponentiations, where Pietrzak [11] and Wesolowski [10]
suggest to iteratively compute τ squarings in an RSA group,
with τ large. Modular exponentiation is a deeply studied
computational problem due to its straightforward importance
in many critical public key encryption algorithms. The best
proven lower complexity bound remains valid even assuming
unbounded parallelism [18], [19]. For this reason, it is possible
to obtain extremely accurate assessments about the timing of
the modular exponentiation operations (and the corresponding
VDF characteristics) based on the best available ASIC designs
for these particular operations. On the contrary, other VDFs,
e.g., the ones based on pairing over elliptic curves [12], have
been subject to much fewer research studies and its parallel
complexity remains unknown.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We formalize here the system model inspired by the IOTA
network [6]. We assume a network N with n nodes. A node
can be either standard (e.g., IoT device, smartphone, laptop)
or specialized (e.g., FPGA, ASIC) hardware, and is connected
to m n neighbors. Every node is involved in the generation
and the verification of transactions, which transfer tokens
between two nodes, or simply carry data. While the verifi-
cation task is fundamental to reach consensus in the network,
in this work we are interested in the transaction generation
which can be exploited to target specific nodes through DoS
attacks. As this transaction generation is not limited by any
fee, without an appropriate access control mechanism, a node
could theoretically generate an infinite number of transactions
per second, leading to network disruption.
We assume that a node has to evaluate a function f
before issuing a transaction. Let the value θi(f) represent
the throughput at node i when evaluating function f . For
instance, assume that f is SHA-256, the hash function used in
Bitcoin: The ASIC Ebit E10 can compute 18,000,000 MHash/s
(θASIC = 1.8 × 1013), while a standard CPU i7 3930K can
only compute 66 MHash/s (θCPU = 6.6 × 107). Depending
on the function used, the unit of measurement may change.
The goal of our work is described in the following:
Problem statement. Choose a function f such that the
maximum speedup in throughput S is minimized, i.e.,
argmin
f
S(f) , maxi∈N θi(f)
mini∈N θi(f)
. (1)
This task is particularly challenging in heterogeneous net-
works, where devices with very different capabilities are
present. Consider, for example, a DoS prevention mechanism
based on the solution of a PoW: Specifically, before issuing
a transaction each node is required to find an input for a
hash function which output begins with a certain amount
of zeros in its binary representation. The only known way
of finding such an input is trying randomly the inputs until
finding a suitable output. The more zeros are required, the
more difficult the PoW is. However, if the PoW is too easy,
then an ASIC can speed up the solution of the puzzle by
several orders of magnitude and outperform non-specialized
hardware; on the other hand, if the PoW is too difficult, then
DoS attacks are prevented, but low power devices will not
have enough computational power to issue transactions in a
reasonable time. In the following section, we propose a DoS
protection mechanism where the function f is a VDF.
IV. PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section, we present our DoS prevention mechanism
(Figure 1) which is defined by the following algorithms:
• Evaluation. When node i decides to generate transaction n,
it is required to solve a VDF such that its input is the hash
of transaction n− 1 issued by the same node.
• Proof. Node i also generates a proof to facilitate the verifi-
cation task, which gossips along with the transaction.
• Verification. When a new transaction is received, node j
verifies whether the VDF has been solved correctly. If yes,
it forwards the transaction (and the proof) to its neighbors,
or discards it otherwise.
All nodes share the following public inputs3:
• VDF difficulty. A difficulty τ ∈ N, which indicates the
number of sequential operations to solve. This difficulty can
be adapted according to, e.g., node’s reputation to mitigate
Sybil attacks.
• RSA modulus. A modulus N = p · q which has bit-length
λ (typically 1024, 2048, or 3072), and is the product of
3Depending on the degree of decentralization targeted, these inputs can
either be preset by the network manager or generated in a distributed way by
the nodes.
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Fig. 1: VDF integration in the IOTA protocol: The evaluator
node uses its last transaction as the input for the new VDF
(above); a verifier node receives the transaction and the proof
from node i, and verifies the correctness of the VDF (below).
The protocol cloud represents the values known by all nodes.
two prime numbers of the same order. Due to the similarity
with the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem [20],
we refer to N as RSA modulus. The security of the entire
mechanism relies on the length of N : the longer is the
modulus, the more difficult is to find its factorization. For
further information about RSA modulus factorization, we
refer the interested reader to [21]. How to securely generate
the RSA modulus without any sort of centralization is an
active research topic [22]–[24].
• Cryptographic hash function. A hash function H(m) such
that H(m) : {0, 1}∗ 7→ [0, 2k], where m is a binary
message, and k is a security parameter. A typical value for
k is 128, and one could use SHA-256. Having this in mind,
we also define Hprime(m) which gives the smallest prime
greater or equal to H(m) for a given message m:
Hprime(m) = min{x ∈ N | x ≥ H(m) ∧ x prime}.
This hash function will be used in the evaluation and the
proof of the VDF.
Our VDF design also addresses resource constraints in terms
of (i) bandwidth and (ii) computational capabilities: (i) Little
overhead (in bytes) should be added to the transaction as
increasing the transaction size would lead to a lower through-
put; (ii) any device must be able to verify the correctness
of the VDF solution in short time. We choose to build our
mechanism on top of the Wesolowski construction [10] as
it currently provides the best tradeoff between verification
time and lightness of the outputs [13]. We rigorously describe
the VDF evaluation and proof in Section IV-A, the VDF
verification in Section IV-B, and we provide a computational
complexity analysis in Section IV-C.
A. Evaluation and proof generation
Each time a node decides to issue a transaction, it has to
evaluate a VDF. The evaluation takes as an input a binary
message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, which we enforce to be the previous
transaction issued by the same node4. In this way, the protocol
ensures the sequentiality of the VDFs evaluations because a
4In the case the node is issuing its first transaction, it will use the timestamp
included inside the transaction.
node has to wait for a VDF to complete before starting a new
evaluation. In other terms, it is not possible to evaluate several
VDFs in parallel to overcome node’s allowed throughput. The
challenge for the solver is computing y such that
y = x2
τ
mod N, (2)
with x , H(m). This can be done only using τ sequential
squarings. We stress that it is crucial that the factorization of N
remain unknown, otherwise the computation of Eq. (2) could
be reduced to extremely simpler modular exponentiations.
Unlike PoW, in VDFs there is no trivial way to verify
whether a node has correctly solved Eq. (2). To favor this task,
we impose that the node computes the following numbers:
• l = Hprime(x+y), that is the smallest prime number larger
than the hash of the sum of the VDF input x and output y;
• pi = xb2
τ/lc, that is an exponentiation of x by the result of
a long division of 2τ by l.
The resulting proof is the pair {l, pi}, which has a size of
λ + 2k bits. The summation between x and y ensures that
the challenge has been successfully solved. Furthermore, to
reduce transaction size, we can avoid sending the output y: In
fact, a verifier can easily recompute y from the knowledge of
l and pi. We will elaborate on this idea in the next paragraph.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the evaluation and the proof.
Algorithm 1: Evaluation and proof of the VDF
input : m ∈ {0, 1}∗, τ ∈ N
output: pi ∈ [0, N − 1], l prime ∈ [0, 22k − 1]
x← H(m)
y ← h
for k ← 1 to τ do
y ← y2
end
l← Hprime(x+ y)
pi = xb2
τ/lc
return (pi, l)
B. Verification
In the previous subsection, we have introduced the proof
necessary to verify the VDF solution in short time. The first
step is to reconstruct the VDF output y using
y = (pil · xr) mod N, (3)
where r = 2τ mod l. To verify that the solver has correctly
computed y, the verifier will simply check if Hprime(x+y) =
l. The verification task is described in Algorithm 2.
As an additional remark, the multi-exponentiation part of the
verification phase given by Eq. (3) takes the vast majority of
the total verification time. Hence, optimizing this computation
can be crucial. In our simulations, we propose a way to speed
up this task through a multi-exponentiation technique based
on the algorithm presented in [14].
Algorithm 2: Verification of the VDF
input : x, τ, pi, l
output: True or False
x← H(m)
r ← 2τ mod l
y ← pil · xrmod N
if l = Hprime(x+ y) then
return True
else
return False
end
C. Computational complexity analysis
The computational complexity of the proposed protocol
depends on the time complexities needed to evaluate y both by
the solver through Eq. (2), and by the verifier through Eq. (3).
1) Computational complexity of the evaluation: The com-
putation of Eq. (2) consists of a single computational primitive,
i.e., modular squaring. The most important thing is that the
computational process is strictly sequential, that is every new
modular squaring operation can start only when the previous
squaring operation is completed.
Result 1: The solver of Eq. (2) is required to exactly
solve τ modular squarings.
To date, there is no known algorithm capable to guarantee
parallel execution of the modular squaring function. Although
there are few chances to find a rigorous proof that this
function does not admit parallel execution, the majority of
cryptographers accept this conjecture as correct [25]. Indeed,
in this field many results are based on conjectures that seem
plausible: For instance, this is the case of RSA, based on the
conjecture that the factorization problem is computationally
intractable; for large RSA key sizes, no efficient method for
solving this problem is known.
2) Computational complexity of the verification: The com-
putation of Eq. (3) can be accomplished in various ways. It is
important to point out that the two modular exponentiations
do not have to be computed separately. The easiest way
to see why this is the case is to consider the computation
of z = x2 · y2. If one computes separately x2, y2, and
their product, one would need three multiplications, whereas
representing z as (x · y)2 needs only two multiplication steps.
We have the following result:
Result 2: The number of operations for the verifier to
compute Eq. (3) requires at most
O
(
2k
log2 2k
)
(4)
multiplications over λ-bit numbers.
Proof: The best algorithms for evaluating y = pil · xr
are based on finding very short vector addition chains for the
vector {l, r}. It is well known that the length of the vector
addition chain is asymptotically equal to the length of the
scalar addition chain for the largest component of the vector.
Therefore, the number of operations for the verifier to compute
Eq. (3) is equal to
log2(max{l, r}) +O
(
log2(max{l, r})
log2(log2(max{l, r})
)
multiplications [26]. Note that max{l, r} ≤ 22k since r < l by
definition, and l is at most 22k. Then, after simple calculations,
one can get obtain the bound of Eq. (4).
From the above, we can deduct the following result:
Result 3: The time needed to verify the correctness of
the VDF output is independent of its difficulty τ .
The previous results are important as they can provide a
clear understanding of the physical limits of the verification
time, which is directly linked to the potential maximum
number of transactions per second allowed in the network.
We will elaborate more on this in the next section, where we
perform experimental simulations.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our VDF-
based DoS prevention mechanism. The algorithms related to
the VDF, namely Algorithms 1-2, have been implemented
in C++ using the GMP library for multi-precision modular
arithmetic. The code is executed on a laptop using an Intel i7-
7820HQ @ 2.90GHz (CPU) and on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B (IoT). As for completeness, we consider the most up-to-
date FPGA solving VDFs according to the results of the VDF
Alliance FPGA contest [27]. Unless otherwise stated, in the
simulations we use a modulus size λ = 2048, and a security
parameter k = 128.
Recall the problem statement that requires to find a func-
tion f to minimize the maximum speedup in throughput. In
Figure 2 we compare two functions, our VDF and a PoW
based on SHA-256. Specifically, we display the speedup in
throughput for different devices computing either VDF or
PoW as a function of their estimated price per hour, which
is computed by amortizing the hardware flat price over one
year added to the power consumption (we take the electricity
price in China as a reference). Data related to PoW are taken
from [28]. The slowest devices are taken as a baseline.
From the plot, we can clearly see that specialized hardware
is able to exploit PoW parallelizability, which leads to a
dramatic speedup. On the other hand, VDF bounds the possible
speedup to less than three orders of magnitude: While it is not
possible to reduce or parallelize the sequential steps of VDF,
an FPGA can actually exploit optimized arithmetic operations
within each single modular squaring. We believe that the
speedup for VDF can be considered a worst-case scenario,
and other IoT devices may show significant better results: The
reason why existing VDFs do not offer a good performance on
this kind of IoT is the fact that they all use a large number of
multi-word divisions. On a Raspberry Pi, these divisions have
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Fig. 2: Speedup for different devices as a function of their
cost (hardware plus electricity consumption) in USD per hour
to compute VDF or PoW. We also show the speedup of
combining 1000 devices in a pool (empty markers). The
baseline is the weakest device for VDF and PoW.
to be entirely implemented at software level, which slows the
execution time many times. Although these considerations do
not apply to SHA-256, which requires very basic operations
such as bit shift or multiplications, the effectiveness of our
solution remains clear. We have also performed simulations
with other hashing functions, and they show similar outcomes.
We additionally consider pools of 1000 devices of the
same type, and we display them in the same figure through
empty markers. As PoW is linearly paralellizable, the speedup
increases by a factor of 1000x when using 1000 machines;
conversely, hardware farms cannot contribute to increase the
speedup for VDFs, where only the estimated cost goes up.
This result alone should justify the choice of using VDFs as
a DoS prevention mechanism in IoT networks.
Figure 3 shows the verification time of the VDF in case
of IoT and CPU. The x-axis represents the challenge τ ∈
{210; 211; 212; 213; 214}, i.e., the number of squarings needed
to evaluate the VDF, and the y-axis shows the time spent in
the verification task in ms. The figure also shows the impact of
the modulus length λ ∈ {1024; 2048; 4096} on the verification
time. The plot validates Result 3, as the verification time is
indeed independent of the difficulty τ . The performance speed
up between CPU and IoT shows a factor of 20 in terms of
verification time, being between 1 and 3 ms for the former and
between 25 to 75 ms for the latter. The limited resources of
IoT devices are confirmed once again to be an important aspect
to consider in the design of our DoS prevention mechanism.
In Figure 4, we show the verification time for laptop using
different multi-exponentiation techniques to compute Eq. (3):
Naive implementation computes pil and xr separately and
then multiplies each term; Lenstra’s algorithm is based on
the technique described in [14], [15], and we use a window-
scanning size of 2 bits. We compare three security level k
(128, 192 or 256 bits) and two modulus length λ (2048 and
4096). From the figure, we can observe that the Lenstra’s
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Fig. 3: Verification time as a function of the modular squarings
τ for different modulus size λ (k = 128).
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Fig. 4: Verification time using multi-exponentiation techniques
for different security levels k and modulus sizes λ on a CPU.
algorithm performs between 12% to 18% better than the
naive implementation when using a 4096 bits modulus and
between 4% to 8% when using a 2048 bit modulus. One
of the most promising possibilities for further improving the
verification time is to use some of the currently proposed
parallel algorithms for multi-exponentiations [29]. This is a
topic of an on-going research within our group.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed the usage of a VDF to
mitigate DoS attacks in IoT-oriented DLTs. Throughout the
paper, we have formulated a rate limiting protocol based on a
modular exponentiation VDF, which introduces low overhead
in the network; additionally, we have provided some funda-
mental analytical findings, and we have validated our design
through actual implementation. We stress that, since VDFs are
a new field of research, which has been mostly studied from a
theoretical point of view, little to no experimental results are
available to date, and our paper is a pioneer in this domain.
Due to the novelty of the VDFs, many are the possible future
directions. To remain in the scope of the paper, we can mention
a few: Software optimization to efficiently solve VDFs on
IoT devices; development of VDFs that do not employ multi-
word division operations; tradeoff analysis between nodes
computational capabilities and energy consumption; optimiza-
tion of the verification time through multi-exponentiation and
parallelization.
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